On the Tractability of Public Persuasion with No Externalities by Xu, Haifeng
ar
X
iv
:1
90
6.
07
35
9v
2 
 [c
s.G
T]
  9
 Ju
l 2
01
9
On the Tractability of Public Persuasion with No Externalities
Haifeng Xu
Harvard University
hxu@seas.harvard.edu
Abstract
Persuasion studies how a principal can influence agents’ decisions via strategic information rev-
elation — often described as a signaling scheme — in order to yield the most desirable equilibrium
outcome. A basic question that has attracted much recent attention is how to compute the optimal public
signaling scheme, a.k.a., public persuasion, which is motivated by various applications including auction
design, routing, voting, marketing, queuing, etc. Unfortunately, most algorithmic studies in this space
exhibit quite negative results and are rifle with computational intractability. Given such background,
this paper seeks to understand when public persuasion is tractable and how tractable it can be. We fo-
cus on a fundamental multi-agent persuasion model introduced by Arieli and Babichenko [3]: many
agents, no inter-agent externalities and binary agent actions, and identify well-motivated circumstances
under which efficient algorithms are possible. En route, we also develop new algorithmic techniques and
demonstrate that they can be applicable to other public persuasion problems or even beyond.
We start by proving that optimal public persuasion in our model is fixed parameter tractable. Our
main result here builds on an interesting connection to a basic question in combinatorial geometry: how
many cells can n hyperplanes divide Rd into? We use this connection to show a new characterization of
public persuasion, which then enables efficient algorithm design. Second, we relax agent incentives and
show that optimal public persuasion admits a bi-criteria PTAS for the widely studied class of monotone
submodular objectives, and this approximation is tight. To prove this result, we establish an intriguing
“noise stability” property of submodular functionswhich strictly generalizes the key result of Cheraghchi
et al. [15], originallymotivated by applications of learning submodular functions and differential privacy.
Finally, motivated by automated application of persuasion, we consider relaxing the equilibrium concept
of the model to coarse correlated equilibrium. Here, using a sophisticated primal-dual analysis, we prove
that optimal public persuasion admits an efficient algorithm if and only if the combinatorial problem of
maximizing the sender’s objective minus any linear function can be solved efficiently, thus establishing
their polynomial-time equivalence.
1 Introduction
The study of how beliefs influence agents’ decisions has a rich history and forms the celebrated field of
information economics. Alone this line, there has been a recent surge of interest in understanding how a
principal can strategically shape agents’ beliefs in order to steer their collective decisions towards the most
desirable equilibrium outcome. This task— often referred to as persuasion or signaling— is intrinsically an
optimization problem, and has attracted much attention in algorithmic game theory [14, 17, 4, 18, 16]. Such
interest in algorithms is partially driven by the potential automated application of persuasion in domains
such as auctions [19, 8], traffic routing [6], recommendation systems [28], marketing [4, 12], customer
queuing [27], voting [2, 14], and security [33, 29].
A foundational model that illustrates the essence of persuasion is the Bayesian persuasion (BP) model
of Kamenica and Gentzkow [23]. Here there are two players, a sender (she) and a receiver (he). The
receiver is faced with selecting one of a number of actions, the payoffs of which are uncertain and depend
on a state of nature drawn from a prior distribution known to both players. However, the sender possesses
an informational advantage and can observe the realized state of nature. In order to improve her utility,
the sender can commit to a policy — often known as a signaling scheme — to strategically reveal her
information before the receiver selects his action. Optimal persuasion refers to the sender’s task of designing
the signaling scheme to maximize her utility.
In many applications, the sender faces multiple receivers and can reveal information to each of them.
In such settings, there are generally two basic signaling models. The first is private persuasion where
the sender can reveal different information to different receivers through a private communication channel.
The second model — which is the focus of this paper — is public persuasion where the sender reveals
the same information to each receiver via a public signaling scheme. Though private persuasion generally
yields higher sender utility, the study of public persuasion has been the focus in much of previous literature
(e.g., [19, 8, 2, 14, 6, 26, 16, 12]). This is due to several reasons. First, in many settings, there are too
many receivers and privately communicating with each receiver is either too costly or impractical (e.g.,
persuading a large population of voters). Second, private persuasion assumes that receivers do not share
their signals/information with each other, which does not hold in many applications. Third, sometimes
revealing disparate information is undesirable due to concerns such as unfairness.
In a seminal work, Kamenica and Gentzkow characterize optimal public persuasion as the concavifica-
tion of the sender’s objective function [23]. Interestingly, despite this simple mathematical characterization,
the corresponding algorithmic problem of efficiently computing the optimal public scheme appears quite
difficult. This is due to at least two key dimensions of challenges in public persuasion, described as follows.
1. Externalities among receivers, as evidenced by previous hardness results for perhaps the most basic
setting in this space. Specifically, [6, 31, 16] consider a sender who looks to persuade two receivers
playing a Bayesian zero-sum game, and rule out any Polynomial TimeApproximation Scheme (PTAS)
for optimal public persuasion assuming planted-clique hardness or the Exponential Time Hypothesis
(ETH). A QPTAS was provided in [14], which essentially matches the complexity lower bound.
2. Coordinating the decisions of many receivers. This is illustrated by the hardness results for another
basic model introduced by Arieli and Babichenko [3]: many receivers with no inter-agent externalities
and binary receiver actions. Dughmi and Xu [18] prove that in this basic setting it is NP-hard to obtain
a PTAS for optimal public persuasion even for linear sender objectives. So far no tractable settings or
efficient approximate algorithms are known for this model.
Given these discouraging messages, the main conceptual motivation of this paper is to understand when
public persuasion is tractable and how tractable it can be. Concretely, we focus on tackling the second
challenge above — that of coordinating the decisions of receivers — in the fundamental multi-agent per-
suasion model by Arieli and Babichenko with no inter-receiver externalities. Each receiver takes a binary
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action from {0, 1}, so the sender’s utility function is a set function over receivers. This model nicely serves
our purpose because it “disentangles” the complexity of coordinating receivers from the complexity due to
agent externalities, and thus allows us to focus on the former. Practically, the model also finds application
in domains such as marketing [4], voting [3], influence on networks [12] and customer queuing [27], to
name a few. We remark that there is no lack of algorithmic study of this model, however previous works all
primarily focused on private persuasion [3, 4, 18]. In contrast, we design efficient and tight algorithms for
public persuasion in well-motivated circumstances. En route, we also develop new algorithmic techniques
and demonstrate that they are applicable to other public persuasion problems or even beyond.
1.1 Our Results and Techniques
We first prove that public persuasion in our model is fix-parameter tractable. Our main result here shows that
the optimal public signaling scheme can be computed in polynomial time for arbitrary sender objective (a
set function) — even those which are intractable to optimize directly — when the number of states of nature
is a constant. This is a surprise to us since the restriction to a small state space does not appear to simplify
the problem at the first glance. Indeed, Babichenko and Barman [4] prove that optimal private persuasion
is APX-hard even in the case with only two states of nature and monotone submodular sender objectives.
Our algorithm here is based on an interesting connection between public persuasion and a basic question in
combinatorial geometry: how many cells can n hyperplanes divide the space of Rd into? We show that a
constructive answer to this question gives rise to a new characterization of public schemes, which leads to
the design of an efficient algorithm. To illustrate the power of this technique, we also show its applicability
to another widely studied persuasion problem, yielding new algorithmic result for that model as well.
Next, we consider public persuasion with relaxed receiver incentives. Here our results concern the
setting where the sender objective is state-independent. This important special case is also the focus of
many previous works including the original model of Arieli and Babichenko [3], and is realistic in various
applications including voting [2], marketing [4, 12] and customer queuing [27] to name a few. We exhibit a
PTAS for public persuasion with a bi-criteria guarantee for monotone submodular sender objectives. This
is essentially the best possible, as we show that there is no bi-criteria FPTAS neither single-criteria PTAS,
unless P=NP. We also illustrate an interesting contrast between public and private persuasion by proving
that it becomes NP-hard to obtain a bi-criteria PTAS for private persuasion in the same setting. Notably,
our algorithm also works for non-monotone submodular objectives, but with a slightly worse guarantee for
the sender’s expected utility. Our result here is built upon an intriguing property of submodular functions
which we believe may be of independent interest. In particular, we prove that the evaluation of submodular
functions is noise-stable: to evaluate a submodular function f : 2[n] → R+ at any set S ⊆ [n], if one slightly
perturbs set S to generate a random set T by adding to S or deleting from S any i ∈ [n] with probability
at most ǫ in an arbitrarily correlated manner, the expected function value ET f(T ) will not decrease much.
Formally, we prove ET f(T ) ≥ (1 − 2ǫ)f(S) for submodular functions whereas ET f(T ) may decrease to
(1−nǫ)f(S) in general. This “noise stability” property of submodular functions strictly generalizes the key
result of Cheraghchi et al. [15], who also proved noise stability of submodular functions but under a weaker
notion of noise with only independent random perturbations (see Section 4.1 for more discussions).
Finally, we consider public persuasion under relaxed equilibrium conditions. Classical persuasion mod-
els assume that receivers play a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in any public signaling scheme, which is also a
Bayes correlated equilibrium [5] in our model due to the absence of externalities. Motivated by automated
applications of persuasion schemes implemented as software (e.g., recommendation systems), we relax this
equilibrium concept to the coarse correlated equilibrium1 and assume that each receiver decides to either
follow the signaling scheme (i.e., adopting the software) or act based to his prior belief (i.e., abandoning the
1Coarse correlated equilibrium for Bayesian games has been studied in other settings such as auctions [11, 13], congestion
games [30] and general Bayesian games [22], and was coined Bayesian coarse correlated equilibrium by Hartline et al. [22].
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software). Under this relaxation, we prove that optimal public persuasion admits an efficient algorithm if and
only if the combinatorial problem of maximizing the sender’s objective function minus any linear function
(subject to no constraints) can be efficiently solved, establishing their polynomial-time equivalence. Our
proof uses a sophisticated primal-dual analysis, generalizes previous techniques in [18] to get rid of their
assumption on the monotonicity of the objective, and thus applies to a broader class of objective functions.
2 The Model and Preliminaries
2.1 Basic Setup
We are a sender facing n receivers, denoted by set [n] = {1, · · · , n}. Each receiver has two actions,
denoted as action 0 and 1. The receiver’s payoff depends only on his own action and a random state of
nature θ supported on Θ. In particular, let ui(θ, 1) and ui(θ, 0) denote receiver i’s utility for action 1 and
action 0, respectively, in state θ; as shorthand, we use ui(θ) = ui(θ, 1) − ui(θ, 0) to denote how much
receiver i prefers action 1 over action 0 given state of nature θ. Let ui ∈ R
Θ denote the vector containing
ui(θ) for all θ and call it the payoff vector of receiver i. The sender’s utility is a function of all the receivers’
actions and the state of nature θ. Let fθ(S) denote the sender’s utility when the state of nature is θ and S is
the set of receivers who choose action 1. The following two properties of set functions will be useful.
Submodularity: f : 2[n] → R is submodular if ∀S, T ⊆ [n], f(S) + f(T ) ≥ f(S ∪ T ) + f(S ∩ T );
Monotonicity: f : 2[n] → R is monotone non-decreasing if ∀T ⊂ S ⊆ [n], f(S) ≥ f(T ).
We remark that previous studies on this model all focus on monotone non-decreasing sender objectives
[3, 4, 18]. However, we do not pose such restriction in this work.
In Bayesian persuasion, it is assumed that θ is drawn from a common prior distribution λ, which is
known to the sender and all receivers. However, the sender possesses an informational advantage, namely,
access to the realized state of nature θ. The sender can commit to a policy— termed a signaling scheme
— that maps the realized θ to a signal for the receivers. The signaling scheme may be randomized, and
hence reveals noisy information regarding θ. The order of events is as follows: (1) The sender commits
to a signaling scheme π; (2) Nature draws θ ∼ λ; (3) Signals are drawn according to π(θ) and sent to
receivers; (4) Each receive updates his belief about the state of nature and selects their actions. Persuasion
is the problem faced by the sender who seeks to design a signaling scheme to maximize her utility.
In the literature, two basic signaling models have been studied in multi-receiver persuasion: (1) the
sender sends a public signal σ and every receiver learns the same information, which is referred to as public
persuasion [19, 6, 16]; (2) the sender can send different (possibly correlated) signals to different receivers
privately, which is referred to as private persuasion [3, 4, 18]. This work focuses on public persuasion,
which is less studied for this model in the previous literature.
2.2 Public Persuasion and Equilibrium Concepts
This subsection describes the model of public signaling, equilibrium concepts, and (limited) previous results
on public persuasion. Though we will not explicitly define private signaling schemes, they can be viewed as
a generalization of public schemes, in which the sender just sends different signals to different receivers.
A public signaling scheme π is a randomized map from Θ to the set of signals Σ. Let π(θ, σ) denote the
probability of selecting signal σ ∈ Σ at the state of nature θ. Since π is public knowledge, after receiving σ,
each receiver can update his posterior belief about θ and then chooses the optimal action from {0, 1} based
on this posterior belief. Throughout the paper, we assume ties are broken in favor of the sender.
As shown in [23, 3] via a revelation-principle style argument, there always exists an optimal public
signaling scheme which is direct and persuasive. By direct we mean that signals correspond to a profile of
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actions s ∈ {0, 1}n, where the i’th entry si corresponds to an action recommendation to receiver i. A direct
scheme is persuasive if its recommendation to each receiver is indeed a best response for him.2 Equivalently,
any s ∈ {0, 1}n can be equivalently viewed as a subset S ⊆ [n], containing all entries of value 1. We will
use these two notations interchangeably throughout the paper.
In this paper, we focus (without loss) on designing direct signaling schemes. A direct scheme can be
captured by variables {π(θ, S)}θ∈Θ,S⊆[n], in which π(θ, S) is the probability of sending signal S — i.e.,
publicly recommending action 1 to receivers in set S and action 0 to receivers in [n]\S—conditioned on the
state of nature θ. Upon receiving signal S, each receiver infers that the state of nature is θ with probability
1∑
θ
λθπ(θ,S)
λθπ(θ, S),∀θ. Therefore, the persuasiveness for signal S implies the following constraints:
1∑
θ
λθπ(θ,S)
∑
θ∈Θ λθπ(θ, S)ui(θ, 1) ≥
1∑
θ
λθπ(θ,S)
∑
θ∈Θ λθπ(θ, S)ui(θ, 0), ∀i ∈ S
1∑
θ
λθπ(θ,S)
∑
θ∈Θ λθπ(θ, S)ui(θ, 1) ≤
1∑
θ
λθπ(θ,S)
∑
θ∈Θ λθπ(θ, S)ui(θ, 0), ∀i 6∈ S
(1)
or equivalently,
∑
θ∈Θ λθπ(θ, S)ui(θ) ≥ 0 for i ∈ S and
∑
θ∈Θ λθπ(θ, S)ui(θ) ≤ 0 for i 6∈ S, where
ui(θ) = ui(θ, 1)− ui(θ, 0). As a result, we can encode the sender’s optimization problem of computing the
optimal public scheme using the following linear program, the size of which is exponential in n.
maximize
∑
θ∈Θ λ(θ)
∑
S⊆[n] π(θ, S)fθ(S)
subject to
∑
θ∈Θ λ(θ)π(θ, S) · ui(θ) ≥ 0, for S ⊆ [n] and i ∈ S.∑
θ∈Θ λ(θ)π(θ, S) · ui(θ) ≤ 0, for S ⊆ [n] and i 6∈ S.∑
S⊆[n] π(θ, S) = 1, for θ ∈ Θ.
π(θ, S) ≥ 0, for θ ∈ Θ;S ⊆ [n].
(2)
To our knowledge, little algorithmic results are known previously regarding optimal public persuasion
for this model, besides the following hardness results.
Theorem 2.1 (Intractability of Public Persuasion [18]). Consider public persuasion with fθ(S) = |S|/n
for any θ ∈ Θ. It is NP-hard to approximate the optimal sender utility to within any constant multiplicative
factor. Moreover, there is no additive PTAS for evaluating the optimal sender utility, unless P = NP.
Equilibrium Concepts. The above derivations all assumed that conditioning on any public signal receivers
play a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, which is also a Bayes correlated equilibrium [5] in this setting because
the receivers have no externalities. In Section 4, we will relax the incentive/persuasiveness constraints and
assume that a receiver will take the recommended action so long as it is at most ǫ worst than the other action.
Formally, we say a public scheme is ǫ-persuasive if the following hold for any signal S ⊆ [n]:∑
θ∈Θ λ(θ)π(θ, S) · ui(θ) ≥ −ǫ, ∀i ∈ S and
∑
θ∈Θ λ(θ)π(θ, S) · ui(θ) ≤ ǫ, ∀i 6∈ S. (3)
Note that whenever ǫ-persuasiveness is considered, we shall assume ui(θ) ∈ [−1, 1] by convention.
In Section 5, we will relax the equilibrium concept to coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE). That is, a
receiver will follow the scheme’s recommendation so long as obedience is better off than opting out of the
signaling scheme and acting just according to his prior belief. This solution concept for Bayesian games is
sometimes also called Bayesian coarse correlated equilibrium [11, 13, 22, 30]. For distinction, we say the
scheme is cce-persuasive in this case, defined as follows.
Definition 2.2 (CCE-Persuasiveness). A signaling scheme π is cce-persuasive if for any receiver i, the
expected utility of following π is at least i’s maximum utility under the prior belief λ. Formally,∑
S:i∈S
∑
θ∈Θ λθπ(θ, S)ui(θ) ≥ max{
∑
θ∈Θ λθui(θ), 0}, ∀i ∈ [n]. (4)
Therefore, the optimal cce-persuasive signaling scheme can be computed via an exponentially large LP
similar to LP (2), but with cce-persuasiveness constraints described in Inequality (4).
2Persuasiveness has also been called incentive compatibility or obedience in prior work.
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2.3 Input Models, Computation, and Approximation
Throughout the paper, we assume value oracle access to the sender’s objectives, which are set function fθ’s.
That is, we can query the value of fθ(S) for any set S using a unit of time. Other than the sender objectives,
the prior distribution λ and receivers’ payoffs are all explicitly given. We will consider approximately
optimal signaling schemes. For convenience in stating our approximation guarantees, we always assume
fθ’s are non-negative functions, i.e., fθ(S) ≥ 0. When a signaling scheme yields expected sender utility at
least c fraction of the best possible, we say it is c-approximate. Sometimes (though rarely) we also consider
additive loss to the sender utility, and say the scheme is ǫ-optimal if its expected sender utility is at most ǫ
less than the best possible. When a signaling scheme is both ǫ-persuasive and c-approximate, we say it is a
bi-criteria approximation to emphasize its loss in both optimality and persuasiveness.
3 Fixed Parameter Tractability of Optimal Public Persuasion
In this section, we show that optimal public persuasion is fixed parameter tractable. Note that when the
number of receivers n is a small constant, it is easy to see that public persuasion can be solved in polynomial
time because LP (2) then has polynomial size. More challenging is the setting where the number of states of
nature |Θ| is a constant. Indeed, the restriction to a small |Θ| does not appear to simplify the problem at the
first glance — private persuasion is proved to be APX-hard even when there are only two states of nature
and the sender’s objective functions are monotone submodular [4]. Surprisingly, we prove that, under mild
non-degeneracy assumptions, the optimal public signaling scheme can be computed efficiently for arbitrary
sender objectives — even those which are intractable to optimize directly — when |Θ| is a constant. This
result illustrates an interesting contrast between public and private persuasion.
The proof of our main result is based on a constructive version of a very basic question in combinatorial
geometry: how many cells can n hyperplanes divide the space of Rd into?3 The answer is O(nd), which is
polynomial in n when d is a constant. We utilize this upper bound and, additionally, design an algorithm to
efficiently identify all these cells (represented as intersection of half-spaces) for constant d. Interestingly, we
show that these cells generated by hyperplanes give rise to a characterization of public signaling schemes,
which is crucial for our algorithm design. To illustrate the power of this approach, in Appendix A.2 we
also show how the same technique can be used to design a new polynomial-time algorithm for another
widely studied multi-agent persuasion problem — i.e., public signaling in second price auctions for revenue
maximization [19, 8, 14] — when the number of states there is a constant. This also complements previous
complexity results from [19] and completed the picture of the fixed parameter tractability of this problem.4
We first observe that if without any assumption, public persuasion cannot be “easier” than directly
optimizing the sender’s objective. Consider the following example.
Example 3.1. There are two states of nature θ1, θ2, each occurring with equal prior probability 1/2. Re-
ceiver i’s payoff vector ui = (ui(θ1), ui(θ2)) = (1,−1) for any i ∈ [n]. It is easy to verify that the optimal
public persuasion reveals no information in this case and is equivalent to solving argmaxS⊆[n] fθ(S).
It turns out that the above difficulty is due to certain degeneracy in the receiver utilities. Specifically,
we say that the receiver payoffs are non-degenerate if for any subset S including |Θ| receivers, their payoff
vectors {ui}i∈S are linearly independent. We prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2. Let |Θ| = d and suppose receiver payoffs are non-degenerate. There is a poly(nd) time algo-
rithm that computes the optimal public signaling scheme for arbitrary sender objective functions {fθ}θ∈Θ.
3Throughout, by “cells” we mean non-degenerated regions with non-zero volumes in Rd.
4Previously, it is only known that this problem is NP-hard when there are n ≥ 3 bidders and admits a polynomial time when
the number of bidders’ value types is a constant [19].
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Proof Sketch. We provide a sketch here and defer the full proof to Appendix A.1. The main difficulty in
computing the optimal public scheme is that there are 2n different public signals. Any efficient algorithm
simply cannot search over all these signals. Our key insight is that when |Θ| = d is small, most of these
public signals actually will never arise in any signaling scheme, assuming non-degeneracy. This turns out to
be a consequence of the problem of dividing Rd by hyperplanes.
Specifically, each public signal induces a posterior distribution p ∈ ∆d over the states in Θ where pθ de-
notes the probability of θ ∈ Θ. The hyperplane
∑
θ∈Θ ui(θ)pθ = 0 cutR
d into two cells:
∑
θ∈Θ ui(θ)pθ > 0
where receiver i always prefers action 1 and
∑
θ∈Θ ui(θ)pθ < 0 where receiver i always prefers action 0.
With n receivers, Rd will be cut by n hyperplanes into O(nd) cells and each cell is uniquely characterized
by a n-dimensional binary vector s ∈ {0, 1}n, in which the i’th entry si indicates receiver i’s best response
action. We call vector s the label of that cell. Any p from a cell of label s can induce si as receiver i’s best
response. In other words, each label s corresponds to a public signal that can possibly arise.
We wish to show that these O(nd) labels of cells are precisely all the public signals that can possibly
arise in public persuasion. As a result, we can then compute the optimal signaling scheme by restricting LP
(2) to only these O(nd) public signals. However, there are two technical challenges for this approach. First,
besides these labels, many other public signals actually can also arise in general. For instance, in Example
3.1, we only have two cells but all the 2n signals are valid due to (exponentially) many possible ways of
tie breaking. This will be problematic when we search for the optimal signaling scheme. Fortunately, we
prove in Lemma 3.3 that under mild non-degeneracy assumption of receiver utilities, all the public signals
that can possibly arise indeed correspond to the labels of all the O(nd) cells. Second, we need to know
exactly what are these possible public signals in order to formulate the linear program. This is addressed by
Lemma 3.4 in which we design an algorithm to identify all these public signals, i.e., all the cells generated
by n hyperplanes. At a high level, the algorithm iteratively adds each hyperplane and identify all the newly
generated cells at each iteration.
Lemma 3.3. Suppose receiver payoffs are non-degenerate. Then all public signals that can possibly arise
are precisely all the labels of cells generated by the n hyperplanes cutting Rd.
Lemma 3.4. [Cutting Rd with n Hyperplanes] Any n hyperplanes divide Rd into O(nd) cells. Moreover,
all these cells can be identified (represented as intersections of n half-spaces) in poly(nd) time.
Remark 3.5. Theorem 3.2 can be generalized to the setting where each receiver has k actions instead of
only two. In this case, each receiver corresponds to k(k− 1)/2 hyperplanes since we need to compare each
pair of actions. We can similarly characterize all the possible public signals by examining the cells obtained
from dividing ∆d by n×
k(k−1)
2 hyperplanes, and obtain a poly(n
dk2d) time algorithm.
The key property that enables efficient computation of public persuasion — even when directly opti-
mizing the sender’s objective function is completely intractable — is its “limited expressiveness” due to the
restriction to public signals. That is, when d is small, public schemes can only induce a small set of outcomes
(i.e., profiles of receiver actions). This is fundamentally due to the fact that every receiver derives the same
posterior belief from a public signal. As a consequence, the sender’s utility only depends on her objective
function at these limited number of outcomes. This is why the structure of the sender’s objective functions
did not play any role in our algorithm for public persuasion. In contrast, the computational complexity of
private persuasion — even when there are only two states of nature — is governed by the complexity of
optimizing the sender’s objective, as shown in [18].
4 Public Persuasion with Relaxed Persuasiveness
We now consider public persuasion with relaxed receiver incentives. That is, instead of insisting on exactly
persuasive schemes, we allow the scheme to be ǫ-persuasive for some small ǫ as formally defined in Inequal-
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ities (3). Here, our result concerns the setting where the sender’s objective function is not affected by the
state of nature, i.e., fθ = f for all θ. This important special case has been the focus of many previous works
including the original model by Arieli and Babichenko [3], and is realistic in applications including, but not
limited to, voting [2], marketing [4, 12] and customer queuing [27].
We design a tight approximate algorithm for computing an ǫ-persuasive public signaling scheme for
submodular sender objectives, a natural class of set functions which are widely used to model agents’
utilities. The crux in the analysis of this algorithm is to prove an intriguing “noise stability” property
of submodular functions, which strengthens the key result of Cheraghchi et al. [15]. In particular, [15]
proved the noise stability of submodular functions under certain noise model motivated by applications of
learning submodular functions and differential privacy. Our analysis proves exactly the same noise stability
guarantee as in [15] but under a strictly stronger (i.e., more adversarial) noise model. We provide a more
detailed comparison in Section 4.1. It is an interesting open question to see whether this strengthened noise
stability property can lead to stronger guarantees for the applications mentioned in [15].
We first state the performances of our algorithm for public persuasion.
Theorem 4.1. Consider public persuasion with fθ = f for any θ. If f is monotone submodular, then there
is a poly(n, |Θ|1/ǫ) time algorithm that outputs a (1 − ǫ)-approximate and ǫ-persuasive public signaling
scheme for any ǫ ∈ (0, 1). If f is non-monotone submodular, then there is a poly(n, |Θ|1/ǫ) time algorithm
that outputs a 12(1− 2ǫ)-approximate and ǫ-persuasive public scheme for any ǫ ∈ (0, 1).
Remark 4.2. The multiplicative approximation guarantee of the sender utility in Theorem 4.1 is a conse-
quence of the conventional multiplicative guarantees for submodular maximization. As we shall see later,
the approximation guarantee of the sender utility is closely related to the problem of directly maximizing the
function f . Indeed, any additive approximation algorithm for maximizing f can also be used to compute a
public signaling scheme with additive guarantee for the sender utility.
The next two results illustrate: (1) The approximation guarantees in Theorem 4.1 are essentially the best
possible; (2) Similar results are not possible for private persuasion, showing an interesting contrast between
public and private persuasion.
Proposition 4.3 (Tightness of Theorem 4.1). For any constant c > 0, there is no poly(n, |Θ|) time algorithm
that computes a c-approximate and ( 14n)-persuasive public scheme even when fθ = f = |S|, unless P = NP.
Proposition 4.4 (The Contrast to Private Persuasion). Suppose fθ = f for any θ ∈ Θ and f is monotone
submodular. Unless P=NP, there is no poly(n, |Θ|1/ǫ) time algorithm that computes an (1−ǫ)-approximate
and ǫ-persuasive private signaling scheme even when there are only two states of nature.
Proposition 4.3 shows that there is no efficient algorithm that can achieve a constant approximation to
the sender utility under the strengthened ǫ-persuasiveness with ǫ = poly ( 1n) instead of a constant ǫ. This
proposition strengthened a hardness result in [18] by employing a tighter analysis for their reduction. The
proof of Proposition 4.4 leverages the APX-hardness of approximating the concave closure of monotone
submodular functions due to [4] and “converts” it (through reductions) to the NP-hardness of obtaining
bi-criteria approximations. The detailed proofs are deferred to Appendix B.1 and B.2, respectively.
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 4.1. The starting point of our proof is a
general framework developed in Cheng et al. [14], which is useful for designing approximately optimal
signaling schemes. However, our setting is more challenging because the sender’s objective in our problem
is a submodular function, which is APX-hard to maximize directly even when persuasion or incentive is not
present, whereas in all the settings considered in [14], directly maximizing their objective functions is an
easy task. To prove our result, we first adapt and generalize the framework of [14] to incorporate certain
notion of “approximability” of the objective function, defined as follows. Note that in this definition, we
used the alternative notion of s ∈ {0, 1}n to denote a subset, which appears more convenient.
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Definition 4.5 (α-Approximability). A set function f : {0, 1}n → R+ is α-approximable for some α ∈
[0, 1] if there is a polynomial time algorithm such that for any T ⊆ [n] and any given variable values
s0−T ∈ {0, 1}
−T for variables in set −T = [n] \ T , the algorithm finds a s∗T such that
f(s∗T , s
0
−T ) ≥ α · max
sT∈{0,1}T
f(sT , s
0
−T ). (5)
We will use such an algorithm frequently and will call it an α-approximate subroutine for f .
The request of α-approximability is natural since otherwise it is even intractable to evaluate the sender’s
objective value by finding the optimal tie breaking for receivers in set T , which however is crucial for
designing optimal signaling schemes. Observe that any monotone function is 1-approximable since sT = 1
is optimal for maxsT∈{0,1}T f(sT , s
0
−T ). Non-monotone submodular functions are 1/2-approximable since
unconstrained submodular maximization admits a polynomial-time deterministic 1/2-approximation [9].
Another key notion we need is the noise stability of the sender objective. As mentioned previously,
noise stability of set functions is not a new concept. Our definition here is a strictly stronger version of
the definition in [15, 20], and can be viewed as a discrete variant of the noise stability defined in [14] for
continuous functions. We start by defining what “noise” mean in discrete cases.
Definition 4.6 (ǫ-Noisy Distribution). Let S ⊆ [n] be any subset and p be a distribution over 2[n]. For any
ǫ ∈ (0, 1), we say p is an ǫ-noisy distribution around S if the following holds simultaneously: (1) for any
i ∈ S: PrT∼p[i ∈ T ] ≥ 1− ǫ; (2) for any i ∈ [n] \ S: PrT∼p[i ∈ T ] ≤ ǫ.
In other words, p is an ǫ-noisy distribution around S ⊆ [n] if the sampled subset T ∼ p “almost”
equals S, except that T may exclude any i ∈ S and include any i 6∈ S, each with marginal probability at
most ǫ. Therefore, we can view ET∼p f(T ) as a noisy evaluation of function f at set S, during which S
is slightly perturbed. Our definition of noise stability lower bounds how much the expected function value
would decrease under arbitrary noisy evaluation of f at any subset S.
Definition 4.7 (Noise Stability). A set function f : 2[n] → R+ is β-noise-stable, or β-stable for short, if for
any S ⊆ [n], any ǫ ∈ (0, 1), and any ǫ-noisy distribution p around S, we have:
E
T∼p
f(T ) ≥ (1− βǫ)f(S). (6)
It turns our that the approximability and noise stability of f implies an efficient bi-criteria approximation
for public persuasion, as stated in the following proposition whose proof is deferred to Appendix B.3.
Proposition 4.8. Suppose fθ = f for all θ and f is α-approximable and β-stable, then there is a poly(n, |Θ|
1/ǫ)
time algorithm that outputs an α(1− βǫ)-approximate and ǫ-persuasive public signaling scheme.
Note that Proposition 4.8 also holds if both the α-approximability and β-stability are defined in the
additive manner. That is, if f(s∗T , s
0
−T ) ≥ maxsT∈{0,1}T f(sT , s
0
−T ) − α and ET∼p f(T ) ≥ f(S) − βǫ,
then there is a poly(n, |Θ|1/ǫ) time algorithm that computes an (α + βǫ)-optimal (in additives sense) and
ǫ-persuasive public scheme.
As mentioned previously, α-approximability is easily satisfied by submodular functions, monotone (1-
approximable) or non-monotone (1/2-approximable). So central to the proof of Theorem 4.1 is to prove
the β-noise-stability of submodular functions for small β, which is also the main technical novelty of our
proof. Since this property of submodularity is also interesting in its own, we state it as a theorem. Note that
Theorem 4.9 and Proposition 4.8 yield a proof to Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 4.9. Any submodular function f : 2[n] → R+ is 2-noise-stable. If f is also monotonically non-
decreasing, then f is 1-noise-stable. Moreover, the bound of 1-noise-stability for monotone submodular
functions is tight even for non-negative linear functions.
8
4.1 Additional Discussions on Noise Stability and Its Connection to Previous Literature
Here we provide some additional discussions on noise stability and its connection to previous literature. It is
not difficult to see that any set function is n-noise-stable; Moreover, supermodular functions are not β-stable
for any β < n (see Appendix B.4 for a proof). Previously, only a few simple functions of concrete forms,
e.g., f(S) = |S| and f(x) = max2i∈[n] xi (max2 outputs the second largest value among xi’s), are shown
to have small noise stability [14]. To our knowledge, submodular functions are the first non-trivial yet rich
class of functions which are shown to all have small noise stability (under our notion).
Our definition of noise stability strictly strengthens a previous definition by Cheraghchi et al. [15]. The
key difference between our definition and that of [15] lies at the type of noise that is allowed. They consider
the following noisy distribution, rephrased in our terminology for easier comparisons.
Definition 4.10 (Independent-Noise Distribution, adapted from [15]). Let S ⊆ [n] be any subset and pI be
any independent distribution over 2[n] (i.e., S′ ∼ pI includes each i ∈ [n] independently with probability
pIi ). We say distribution p over 2
[n] is a (ρ,pI)-independent-noise distribution around S if its set T ∼ p is
generated via the following process: for any i ∈ [n], with probability ρ include i to T if and only if i ∈ S,
and with probability 1− ρ include i to T independently with probability pIi .
That is, an independent-noise distribution around S simply adds independent noise to S with probability
ρ. Observe that any (ρ,pI)-independent-noise distribution around S is an ǫ-noisy distribution in the sense
of our Definition 4.7 for ǫ = (1 − ρ)(1 − pmin) where pmin = min{p
I
i , 1 − p
I
i }i∈[n] is the minimum
marginal probability of pI — in fact this is true even when pI is an arbitrary distribution, not necessarily
independent. This is because each i ∈ [n] is perturbed with probability at most (1 − ρ)(1 − pmin) in any
(ρ,pI)-independent-noise distribution. Therefore, our notion of noise stability is strictly stronger.
Theorem 4.11 (Main Result of [15]). For any submodular function f : 2[n] → R+ and any (ρ,pI)-
independent-noise distribution p, we have
E
T∼p
f(T ) ≥ (2ρ− 1 + 2pmin(1− ρ))f(S).
Now we can see that Theorem 4.11 follows from Theorem 4.9 by observing (2ρ− 1+ 2pmin(1− ρ)) =
1 − 2ǫ for ǫ = (1 − ρ)(1 − pmin). Thus, Theorem 4.9 shows that submodular functions are noise-stable in
a stronger sense than shown previously but with exactly the same guarantee. We remark that the proof in
[15] relies crucially on their independent noise assumption and does not appear applicable to our (stronger)
notion of noise stability. Our proof takes a completely different route and is more involved.
4.2 Noise-Stability of Submodular Functions — Proof of Theorem 4.9
We will first consider general submodular functions without the monotonicity assumption. At the end of the
proof, we illustrate how monotonicity allows us to tighten the analysis to achieve a better bound.
According to Definition 4.7, we need to prove that for any submodular function f : 2[n] → R+, any
S ⊆ [n] and any ǫ-noisy distribution p around S, we have ET∼p f(T ) ≥ (1 − 2ǫ)f(S). Equivalently, we
can rephrase this requirement using the language of optimization, as follows: among all possible ǫ-noisy
distributions around S, the minimum value of ET∼p f(T ) is at least (1− 2ǫ)f(S).
Our proof has three main steps. The first step is to formulate the noise stability requirement as a prob-
lem of lower bounding the optimal objective of certain (exponentially large) linear program. We start by
characterizing the set of all ǫ-noisy distributions around S. Let p = {p(T )}T⊆[n] denote a distribution over
2[n]. By Definition 4.6 p is an ǫ-noisy distribution around S if and only if the following constraints hold:
(1)
∑
T :i∈T p(T ) ≤ ǫ for all i 6∈ S; (2)
∑
T :i∈T p(T ) ≥ 1 − ǫ for all i ∈ S. Crucially, these are all linear
constraints on p. As a result, the minimum value of ET∼p f(T ) among all possible ǫ-noisy distributions
9
around S corresponds precisely to the optimal objective value of the following linear problem with variables
{p(T )}T⊆[n]. The noise stability requirement can be equivalently stated as proving the optimal objective of
LP (7) is at least (1− 2ǫ)f(S).
minimize
∑
T⊆[n] p(T )f(T )
subject to
∑
T :i∈T p(T ) ≤ ǫ, for i /∈ S.∑
T :i∈T p(T ) ≥ 1− ǫ, for i ∈ S.∑
T⊆[n] p(T ) = 1
p(T ) ≥ 0, for T ⊆ [n].
(7)
The second step of our proof is to establish a useful property of the optimal solution to LP (7), which
is a consequence of submodular minimization. In particular, we show that there always exists an optimal
solution p∗ = {p∗(T )}T⊆[n] to LP (7) which is a chain distribution. That is, for any T, T
′ in the support of
p∗, either T ⊂ T ′ or T ′ ⊂ T .
To prove this fact, let p∗ = {p∗(T )}T⊆[n] be any optimal solution to LP (7). We will adjust p
∗ to
another solution which remains optimal but satisfies the stated property. Our adjustment repeatedly execute
the following merging operation: for sets T, T ′ with p∗(T ) ≥ p∗(T ′) > 0, let T1 = T ∪T
′ and T2 = T ∩T
′;
we adjust p∗ by decreasing p∗(T ), p∗(T ′) both by the amount of p∗(T ′) and moving this probability mass to
p∗(T1), p
∗(T2). More formally, the merging operation is described as follows: p
∗(T1) ← p
∗(T1) + p
∗(T ′),
p∗(T2) ← p
∗(T2) + p
∗(T ′) and then p∗(T ) ← p∗(T ) − p∗(T ′), p∗(T ′) ← 0. Intuitively, we are taking an
equal probability mass of T and T ′ and “re-distributing” it to their union T ∪ T ′ and intersection T ∩ T ′.
This merging operation satisfies two properties. First, the marginal probability of each element being in
T ∼ p∗ does not change, and thus the feasibility constraints in LP (7) remain satisfied. This is because
the operation simply re-distributed the probability mass of each element from sets T, T ′ to T ∪ T ′, T ∩ T ′.
Second, and crucially, the objective value of the new p∗ does not increase due to submodularity, and thus
remains an optimal (minimum) solution. This is because the operation decreases the objective value by
p∗(T ′)[f(T ) + f(T ′)− f(T ∪ T ′)− f(T ∩ T ′)], which is at least 0 by submodularity.
It remains to show that the above adjustment will result in a chain distribution. Observe that this adjust-
ment will always be possible as long as the support of p∗ is not a chain yet. Therefore, when the adjustment
process terminates, we must have obtained an optimal solution that is a chain distribution. However, it is not
clear yet that starting from any initial p∗, this adjustment process will ultimately terminate because it might
get into an infinite loop. We now prove that an infinite loop is not possible and thus the adjustment must
terminate within a finite step. This is a consequence of the following two facts.
1. We will never return to the same p∗ during the adjustment. This follows from a potential function
argument. Let g(T ) be any strict submodular function (e.g., g(T ) = log |T |), satisfying for any
S ⊂ T ⊆ [n] and i 6∈ T , we have g(S ∪ {i}) − g(S) > g(T ∪ {i}) − g(T ). Define the potential
of any distribution p to be
∑
T⊆[n] p(T )g(T ). It is easy to see that the merging operation will strictly
increase the potential due to strict submodularity. Therefore, the adjustment process cannot return to
the same distribution.
2. The adjustment can only result in a finite number of possible p∗. This is because p∗, as the optimal
solution to LP (7), has finite bit complexity (say bit complexity C) and the adjustment does not
change the bit complexity of p∗ because it only uses additions and subtractions. Therefore, there are
only finitely many p∗ that can arise since each entry of p∗ must be a multiple of 1/2C . As a result,
the adjustment must terminate within a finite step, at which point we obtain an optimal solution to LP
(7) which is a chain distribution.
The third and final step of our proof is to lower bound the optimal objective of LP (7). Let p∗ be any
optimal solution that is a chain distribution. Moreover, let x∗i =
∑
T :i∈T p
∗(T ) be the marginal probability
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that i belongs to the random set T ∼ p∗. Without loss of generality, assume that the elements are sorted in
descending order in term of {x∗i }i∈[n]. That is, x
∗
i ≥ x
∗
i+1 for all i = 1, · · · , n − 1. For convenience, let
x∗0 = 1 and x
∗
n+1 = 0, which will be useful as notations.
With the above representation and the fact that p∗ is a chain distribution, we know that p∗ must be the
following distribution: p∗(Ti) = x
∗
i − x
∗
i+1(≥ 0), for all i = 0, 1, · · · , n, where Ti = {1, ..., i} and T0 is
the empty set ∅. We only consider ǫ < 1/2 since otherwise ET∼p f(T ) ≥ (1 − 2ǫ)f(S) trivially holds.
The constraints in LP (7) imply that for any i ∈ S, we must have x∗i ≥ 1 − ǫ > 1/2 and for any i 6∈ S we
have x∗i ≤ ǫ < 1/2. Since the elements are sorted in descending order of x
∗
i , the elements in S must be
exactly the first |S| = k elements in the sequence 1, · · · , n. In other words, S = {1, ..., k} = Tk. Moreover,
p∗(Tk) = x
∗
k − x
∗
k+1 ≥ 1 − ǫ − ǫ since x
∗
k ≥ 1 − ǫ and x
∗
k+1 ≤ ǫ. As a result, we can lower bound the
optimal objective value of LP (7), as follows:
∑
T⊆[n]
p∗(T )f(T ) =
n∑
i=0
p∗(Ti)f(Ti)
= p∗(Tk)f(Tk) +
∑
i 6=k
p∗(Ti)f(Ti)
≥ (1− 2ǫ)f(S).
Since S and ǫ are chosen arbitrarily, this shows that any submodular function f : 2[n] → R+ is 2-noise-
stable.
The analysis for monotone submodular functions is similar, but utilizes an additional property of min-
imizing a monotone non-decreasing function. That is, when f is monotone, LP (7) always admits an op-
timal solution such that x∗i =
∑
T :i∈T p
∗(T ) = 0 for any i 6∈ S due to monotonicity. Therefore, in the
last step of the above analysis, we have p∗(S) = x∗k − x
∗
k+1 ≥ 1 − ǫ since x
∗
k+1 = 0. This implies∑
T⊆[n] p
∗(T )f(T ) ≥ (1 − ǫ)f(S) and thus f is 1-stable. It is straightforward to verify that the bound of
1-noise-stability is tight for, e.g., f(S) = |S|.
5 Public Persuasion under Relaxed Equilibrium Conditions
In this section, we consider public persuasion under relaxed equilibrium conditions. Classically in per-
suasion, persuasiveness constraints require that any recommended action to each receiver must indeed be
his best response and thus it is in each receiver’s best interest to follow a direct scheme’s recommendations.
Here, we relax this constraint and assume that each receiver would follow the scheme’s recommendations so
long as the overall expected utility from the scheme is at least his best utility when acting based on his prior
belief. This is motivated by applications where the persuasion scheme can be implemented as a software
(e.g., recommendation systems like Google Maps, Yelp, etc.). Receivers have the options of either adopting
the software (i.e., following the scheme’s recommendations) or abandoning it (i.e., behaving according to
their prior beliefs). As formally described in Definition 2.2, we call such a scheme cce-persuasive due to its
relation to coarse correlated equilibrium.
Our main result of this section shows that the complexity of computing the optimal cce-persuasive public
scheme is governed by the complexity of directly maximizing the sender’s objective function minus an
arbitrary linear function. As a corollary, it implies that computing the optimal cce-persuasive public scheme
is tractable for supermodular or anonymous sender’s objective, and NP-hard for submodular objectives. To
describe our result, let F denote any collection of set functions. As a mild assumption, we assume F always
contain the trivial function f ≡ 0, i.e., f always equals 0 for any input. Let I(F) denote the class of all
persuasion instances in which the sender’s objective function fθ ∈ F for all θ ∈ Θ but receiver payoffs can
be arbitrary. We prove the following result.
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Theorem 5.1. Let F be any collection of set functions that includes the trivial function f ≡ 0. There is
a polynomial time algorithm that computes the optimal cce-persuasive public scheme for any instance in
I(F) if and only if there is a polynomial time algorithm for maximizing f(S) −
∑
i∈S wi subject to no
constraints for any f ∈ F (with value oracle access) and any set of weights wi ∈ R.
Proof Sketch. We provide a sketch here and defer the full proof to Appendix C. The proof is divided into
two parts. First, we show that computing the optimal cce-persuasive public scheme reduces in polynomial
time to the combinatorial problem of maximizing set function f(S) = f(S)−
∑
i∈S wi for any f ∈ F and
weights {wi}
n
i=1, subject to no constraints. This can be shown by formulating the persuasion problem as an
exponentially large linear program and then examining its dual program. It turns out that the set function
optimization problem can be used to construct a separation oracle for the dual.
More involved is the reverse direction. That is, given any efficient algorithm for solving any persuasion
instance from I(F), we need to design an efficient algorithm for the set function maximization problem.
Given any f ∈ F and a set of weights {wi}i∈[n], we look for an efficient algorithm to maximize f(S) =
f(S) −
∑
i∈S wi over S ⊆ [n]. Let S+ = {i : wi ≥ 0} and S− = {i : wi < 0} denote the set of
indexes of non-negative and negative wi’s, respectively. The first key step is to reduce the maximization
of f(S) to solving the following carefully constructed linear program with variables {wi}i∈[n] and v. Our
reduction utilizes the equivalence between separation and linear optimization [21], and then binary search
for the smallest feasible v which must equal maxS [f(S)−
∑
i∈S wi].
minimize
∑
i∈[n] βi · wi + α · v
subject to v +
∑
i∈S wi ≥ f(S), for S ⊆ [n].
wi ≥ 0, for i ∈ S+.
wi ≤ 0, for i ∈ S−.
(8)
Then we want to show that solving the persuasion problem can help us to solve the dual program of LP
(8) (note: LP (8) itself is a minimization problem, which is not appropriate). Unfortunately, this is not true
when linear coefficient α ≤ 0. However, we can prove that LP (8) can be directly (and efficiently) solved
when α ≤ 0 by analyzing the structure of the program. Therefore, we only need to worry about the case
with α > 0, for which we manged to construct a persuasion instance such that its optimal cce-persuasive
public scheme can be used to derive an optimal solution to the dual of LP (8).
We remark that our proof of Theorem 5.1 builds on and generalizes a duality-based analysis employed in
[18], which proved a similar equivalence theorem but for optimal private persuasion. However, the analysis
in [18] relies crucially on the assumption that the sender’s objective functions are monotone non-decreasing.
Our result gets rid of the monotonicity assumption completely and thus applies to a broader class of objective
functions. This, however, also necessitates a more involved proof. Our argument relies on a more carefully
constrained linear program as well as the analysis of its properties in order to avoid the dependence on the
objective function’s monotonicity. In the full proof, we highlight the key differences from the proof of [18].
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A Omissions from Section 3
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Recall that in (direct) public schemes, each signal can be viewed as a subset S ⊆ [n] of receivers who are
incentivized to take action 1while the remaining receivers are incentivized to take action 0. For convenience,
we sometimes also denote a subset S as a binary vector s ∈ {0, 1}n , satisfying si = 1 if and only if i ∈ S.
The main difficulty in designing optimal public scheme is that there are possibly 2n different public signals
and any efficient algorithm simply cannot search over all these exponentially many signals. Our key insight
is that for a persuasion instance with small |Θ| = d, most of these public signals actually will never arise
in any public signaling scheme, assuming non-degenerate receiver payoffs. In fact, for any non-degenerate
persuasion instance, there are only O(nd) signals that can possibly arise in public schemes and, moreover,
these public signals can be efficiently identified in poly(nd) time. This turns out to be a consequence of the
problem of dividing Rd by hyperplanes.
Specifically, each public signal induces a posterior distribution p ∈ ∆d over the states in Θ. We use
pθ to denote the probability of θ ∈ Θ. Note that, any posterior distribution that induces receiver i to take
action 1 [resp. 0] must satisfy 〈ui, p〉 =
∑
θ∈Θ ui(θ)pθ ≥ 0 [resp.
∑
θ∈Θ ui(θ)pθ ≤ 0]. In other words,
the hyperplane
∑
θ∈Θ ui(θ)pθ = 0 cut the simplex∆d of posterior distributions into at most two cells, each
corresponding to receiver i’s best response of action 1 and 0, respectively. With n receivers, the simplex
will be cut by n hyperplanes and each cell — the intersection of n half-spaces restricted to the simplex
∆d— is uniquely characterized by a n-dimensional binary vector s ∈ {0, 1}
n, in which the i’th entry si
indicates receiver i’s best response action (action 1 for “≥” and action 0 for “≤”). We call vector s the label
of that cell. Since s also specifies each receiver’s best response. We will also refer to it as “response vector”
and will use the term “label” and “response vector” interchangeably. Note that cells may intersect at some
boundary, which will correspond to multiple labels due to ties.
Each cell has a unique label, however the reverse may not be true due to a subtle issue. That is, there
may exist response vectors that can arise but do not correspond to any of the generated cells. Example
3.1 provides such an instance — there are only 2 cells but 2n possible public signals. It turns out that this
difficulty is due to the degeneracy of receiver payoffs. Assuming non-degenerate receiver payoffs, we can
characterize all the response vectors that can possibly arise and upper bound the total number of them, as
described in the following two lemmas. For convenience, in Lemma A.1 and A.2, we will describe the
characterizations by relaxing the domain of p from ∆Θ to R
Θ. At the end of the proof, we show how to
adapt the characterization for p ∈ ∆Θ.
Lemma A.1 (Restating Lemma 3.3). Suppose receiver payoffs are non-degenerate and p takes values in
R
Θ. Then all response vectors that can possibly arise are precisely all the labels of cells generated by the n
hyperplanes in RΘ.
Proof. Let Σ ⊆ {0, 1}n denote the set of all response vectors that can possibly arise, and S ⊆ {0, 1}n
denote the set of labels of all the cells generated by cutting RΘ with n hyperplanes:
∑
θ∈Θ ui(θ)pθ = 0,
denoted as li, for i = 1, · · · , n. We will prove Σ = S .
Note that by definition we have S ⊆ Σ since any s ∈ S is the label of a cell, i.e., a possible response
vector. We prove the reverse Σ ⊆ S . In particular, we show that for any p ∈ RΘ, any possible response
vector it induces is contained in S . This follows a discussion about which subspace p sits in. If p ∈ RΘ is
in the interior of some cell, then the only response vector it can induce is the label of that region.
Let |Θ| = d. More generally, if p is in the interior of some (d− k)-dimensional subspace V generated
as the intersection of our hyperplanes, we claim that V must be the intersection of exactly k hyperplanes and
thus p will only be on these k hyperplanes. Since V is a (d− k)-dimensional subspace, it is the intersection
of at least k hyperplanes. Without loss of generality, let l1, ..., lm be these hyperplanes for somem ≥ k. We
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show thatm must equal k. By definition, there exists “origin” x0 ∈ R
Θ and linearly independent directions
x1, · · · , xd−k ∈ R
Θ such that any p ∈ V can be expressed as x0+
∑d−k
j=1 cj ·xj for some coefficients {cj}
d−k
j=1 .
Since V is the intersection of hyperplanes l1, · · · , lm, we know that 〈ui, xj〉 = 0 for any i = 1, · · · ,m and
j = 1, · · · , d− k. Since xj’s are linearly independent, this means the space spanned by vectors u1, · · · , um
have dimension at most d− (d − k) = k. By our assumption of non-degenerate receiver payoffs, we know
that u1, · · · , um are linearly independent and thus the space they span has dimension at leastm. As a result,
we havem ≤ k, implying m = k.
Therefore, any p in the interior of some (d−k)-dimensional subspace will be on exactly k hyperplanes,
which we denote as l1, · · · , lk for referral convenience. As a result, the number of response vectors it
can induce is 2k due to ties on the k receivers corresponding to these k hyperplanes. Note that p is not
on hyperplane lk+1, · · · , ln, thus there exists a small ball in R
Θ centered at p which does not intersect
lk+1, · · · , ln neither. However, this ball will intersect half spaces
∑
θ∈Θ ui(θ)pθ > 0 and
∑
θ∈Θ ui(θ)pθ < 0
for i = 1, · · · , k, and thus intersect with exactly 2k cells. The labels of these cells are precisely the 2k
response vectors that p can induce.
By varying k = 0, · · · , d, we know that the response vectors induced by any point p ∈ RΘ must be
contained in S . We thus have Σ ⊆ S , concluding the proof.
Next, we prove that RΘ will be divided into O(nd) cells by n hyperplanes and moreover, each of these
cells can be explicitly identified as the intersection of n half-spaces.
Lemma A.2. [Restating Lemma 3.4] Any n hyperplanes divide Rd into O(nd) cells. Moreover, all these
cells can be identified (represented as intersections of n half-spaces) in poly(nd) time.
Proof. The study about how many cells the space of Rd will be divided into by n hyperplanes dates back
to 1820s, first studied by J. Steiner [32]. Since then, this question and its many variants attracted much
attention in the mathematical literature (see, e.g., [10, 1] and references therein). The following fact can be
easily proved by establishing an induction relation.5
Fact A.3. n hyperplanes divide the space of Rd into at most
∑d
i=0
(
n
i
)
= O(nd) cells.
To prove Theorem 3.2, we need to know not only how many cells there are but also what are these
cells, i.e., which linear inequalities generate each cell (i.e., a polyhedron). Here, we describe an algorithm
to compute, for each cell, the linear inequalities that generate the cell. Recall that each cell can be uniquely
determined by a binary vector, which we call its label.
Details are in Algorithm 1. At a high level, our algorithm starts with the whole space Rd and gradually
adds each hyperplane. For each cell, we check whether the added hyperplane cuts the cell into two cells
in which case we create labels for newly generated cells (Step 6 to 8 ) or the cell is strictly on one side
of the hyperplane in which case we augment the label of that cell by taking into account the newly added
hyperplane (Step 9 to 12). The correctness of this algorithm follows from its definition and the fact that
feasibility of a cell determined by linear inequalities can be checked efficiently.
Lemma 3.3 and 3.4 together characterize all the vectors of follower best responses, i.e., all the public
signals, that can possibly arise. The only discrepancy here is that we relaxed the domain of p to RΘ. If we
restrict p ∈ ∆Θ, some of these public signals will be further eliminated. This can be done efficiently by
examining these public signals one by one. We end up with all the possible public signals that can arise for
p ∈ ∆Θ, and there are O(n
d) of them.
5An interesting side note: this problem was also portrayed in the film Let Us Teach Guessing about the famous mathematician
George Po´lya to illustrate induction.
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ALGORITHM 1: Labeling Algorithm for Region Identification
Input: n hyperplanes in Rd: ai · x = bi for i = 1, · · · , n
Output: A list of the labels of all the cells generated by these hyperplanes.
1 Initialization: LabelSet = {[ ]}, meaning starting with the only cell Rd of label length 0 ;
2 for i = 1, · · · , n do
3 for each cell s ∈ LabelSet do
/* Extract linear inequalities, stored in IneqSet, that determine cell s */
4 IneqSet= {};
5 For j ∈ [i− 1], add inequality aj · x ≥ bj to IneqSet if sj = 1; otherwise, add aj · x ≤ bj to IneqSet;
/* Compute the new cells generated by cutting s with hyperplane ai · x = bi */
6 if both IneqSet∪{ai · x ≥ bi} and IneqSet∪{ai · x ≤ bi} are feasible then
7 Remove s from LabelSet ;
8 Add [s; 1] and [s; 0] to LabelSet;
9 else if only IneqSet∪{ai · x ≥ bi} is feasible then
10 Substitute s in LabelSet by [s; 1];
11 else
12 Substitute s in LabelSet by [s; 0];
13 end
14 end
15 end
16 Return LabelSet.
Now let Σ denote the set of all these public signals that can possibly arise in the persuasion instance.
We can then compute the optimal public signaling scheme simply by solving LP (2) but restrict it to signal
space Σ instead of the whole space Σ = 2[n]. This LP can be solved in poly(nd) time.
A.2 Additional Applications of the Technique
In this subsection, we show another application of our technique to the problem of signaling in second
price auctions to maximize the auctioneer’s revenue. This problem has been studied in several previous
works, partially driven by its wide application in online advertising. The general model, first studied by
[19], considers an auctioneer (sender) facing n bidders (receivers). The problem is generally described by
a tuple 〈λ, q, {Vt}t∈[T ]〉, where Vt ∈ R
n×Θ,∀t ∈ [T ] and Vt(i, θ) is bidder i’s value at the state θ. The
auctioneer’s uncertainty regarding bidder values is casted by valuation type t ∈ T . That is, the auctioneer
only knows that value matrix is Vt with probability qt. The public persuasion problem of the auctioneer is
to design a public signaling scheme to maximize her expected revenue.
Emek et al. [19] prove that this problem is NP-hard even when there are n = 3 bidders but admits
a polynomial time when the number of value types |T | is a constant. Invoking Lemma 3.4, we complete
the picture of the fix parameter tractability of this problem by showing that a polynomial time algorithm
exits when |Θ| is a constant. Note that Cheng et al. [14] designs an additive PTAS for this problem, which
however remains a PTAS even when |Θ| is a constant.
Proposition A.4. The optimal public signaling scheme for the above second-price auction model can be
computed in poly(n, |T |) time when |Θ| is a constant.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.2, our idea is also to argue that the number of “outcomes” that can
possibly arise is polynomial in n, |T |. The key to our proof is a properly chosen definition of “outcome” in
this setting. Recall that in second-price auctions, the auctioneer will rank the bidders’ values and any ranking
can be equivalently viewed as a permutation π where π(i) ∈ [n] denotes the bidder whose value is the i’th
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largest. Given any posterior p ∈ ∆Θ, we define an outcome o = {πt}t∈T of p as a set of permutations
where πt denotes the ranking of bidders based on their expected values under the posterior distribution for
value type t. Let Π denote the set of all permutations over [n]. A naive counting argument reveals that
there are at most (n!)|T | outcomes that can possibly arise. However, invoking Lemma 3.4, we show that
only polynomially many outcomes can arise when |Θ| is a constant, and moreover all these outcomes can
be identified efficiently.
Let p ∈ ∆Θ denote a generic posterior distribution. We define the comparison hyperplane for bidder
i, j under value type t, denoted as l(i, j; t), as follows
l(i, j; t) :
∑
θ
Vt(i, θ)pθ =
∑
θ
Vt(j, θ)pθ.
Note that l(i, j; t) is a hyperplane with vector variables p and there are n(n−1)2 |T | comparison hyperplanes.
Now consider∆Θ cut by these comparisons hyperplanes. By Lemma 3.4, they generateO
(
(n(n−1)2 |T |)
|Θ|
)
regions, which can be identified efficiently. Moreover, we argue that each region corresponds to a unique
outcome o. In particular, the interior of any region is a set of posterior distributions. Depending on the side
of l(i, j; t) the region is on, we can tell whether bidder i has higher or lower value than bidder j at value type
t. Aggregating this information across i, j ∈ [n] and t ∈ T , we can extract an outcome o = {πt}t∈T for this
region. Moreover, it is easy to see that different regions will have different outcomes, and let O denote the
set of all outcomes that can possibly arise.
After identifying O and viewing it as the set of needed signals, we can compute the optimal signaling
scheme by the following linear program where variable ϕ(θ, o) is the probability of sending signal o.
maximize
∑
o∈O
∑
t∈T
∑
θ λθϕ(θ, o)Vt(π
o
t (2), θ)
subject to
∑
θ λθϕ(θ, o)[Vt(π
o
t (i), θ) − Vt(π
o
t (i+ 1), θ)] ≥ 0, for i ≤ n− 1, o ∈ O, t ∈ T.∑
o∈O ϕ(θ, o) = 1, for θ ∈ Θ.
ϕ(θ, o) ≥ 0, for θ ∈ Θ, o ∈ O.
(9)
Proposition A.4 then follows from the fact |O| ≤ O
(
(n(n−1)2 |T |)
|Θ|
)
.
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B Omitted Proofs from Section 4
B.1 Proof of Proposition 4.3
Similar to the proof in [18], we also reduce from the same NP-hard problem described as follows but use a
slightly different construction of the persuasion instance to accommodate the relaxation of persuasiveness.
In particular, [25] prove that for any positive integer k, any integer q such that q ≥ 2k +1, and an arbitrarily
small constant ǫ > 0, given an undirected graph G, it is NP-hard to distinguish between the following two
cases:
• Case 1: There is a q-colorable induced subgraph of G containing a (1 − ǫ) fraction of all vertices,
where each color class contains a 1−ǫq fraction of all vertices.
• Case 2: Every independent set in G contains less than a 1
qk+1
fraction of all vertices.
Given graph G with vertices [n] = {1, . . . , n} and edges E, we will construct a public persuasion instance
so that any desired bi-criteria approximate signaling scheme can be used to distinguish these two cases. Let
there be n receivers, and let Θ = [n]. In other words, both receivers and states of nature correspond to
vertices of the graph. We fix the uniform prior distribution over states of nature — i.e., the realized state of
nature is a uniformly-drawn vertex in the graph. We define the receiver utilities as follows: ui(θ) =
1
2 −
1
4n
if i = θ; ui(θ) = −1−
1
4n if (i, θ) ∈ E; and ui(θ) = −
1
2n otherwise. We define the sender’s utility function,
with range [0, 1], to be fθ(S) = f(S) = |S|.
We claim that for any distribution x ∈ ∆Θ, the set S = {i ∈ [n] :
∑
θ∈Θ xθui(θ) ≥ −
1
4n} is an
independent set of G. In particular, for any two adjacent nodes i, j, if xi ≥ xj , we have
∑
θ
xθuj(θ) ≤ xjuj(j) + xiuj(i) +
∑
θ 6=i,j
xθ(−
1
2n
)
= xj(
1
2
−
1
4n
) + xi(−1−
1
4n
)− (1− xi − xj)
1
2n
< −
1
4n
.
Thus, node i 6∈ S. Therefore, at most one of any two adjacent nodes are in S. This shows that upon
receiving any public signal with any posterior distribution x over Θ, the players who take action 1 assuming
1
4n -persuasiveness always form an independent set of G. Therefore, if the graph G is from Case 2, the
sender’s expected utility in any 14n -persuasive public signaling scheme is at most
n
qk+1
.
Now supposing that G is from Case 1, we fix the corresponding coloring of (1 − ǫ)n vertices with
colors k = 1, . . . , q, and we use this coloring to construct a public scheme achieving expected sender utility
at least
(1−ǫ)2
q . The scheme uses q + 1 signals, and is as follows: if θ has color k then deterministically
send the signal k, and if θ is uncolored then deterministically send the signal 0. Given signal k > 0, the
posterior distribution on states of nature is the uniform distribution over the vertices with color k — an
independent set Sk of size
1−ǫ
q n. It is easy to verify that receivers i ∈ Sk prefer action 1 to action 0, since∑
θ∈Sk
1
|Sk|
ui(θ) =
1
|Sk|
(12 −
1
4n −
|Sk|−1
2n ) =
1
|Sk|
(2n−1−2|Sk|+14n ) > 0. Therefore, the sender’s utility is
f(Sk) = |Sk| =
n(1−ǫ)
q whenever k > 0. Since signal 0 has probability ǫ, we conclude that the sender’s
expected utility is at least
n(1−ǫ)2
q . It is now easy to see that there is no, e.g., c-approximate
1
4n -persuasive
public signaling scheme for any constant c since it can be used to distinguish Case 1 (utility at least n(1−ǫ)
2
q )
and Case 2 (utility at most n
qk+1
) for any constants q, k, ǫ.
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B.2 Proof of Proposition 4.4
Previously, Babichenko and Barman [4] proved that it is NP-hard to obtain a (1 − 1e )-approximate, ex-
actly persuasive, private signaling scheme for this setting. The main technical challenge of our proof is to
“transform” this single-criteria approximation hardness result to a bi-criteria approximation hardness. To
do so, we will actually instead prove the hardness of additive approximation of sender utility by assuming
f(S) ∈ [0, 1]. The hardness of additive approximation then implies the hardness of multiplicative approxi-
mation.
We consider the following persuasion instances. There are n receivers and two states of nature θ, θ′, each
happening with equal probability 1/2. At any state, the sender’s objective is the same monotone submodular
function f : 2[n] → [0, 1]. All the receivers have identical payoff structures. In particular, for any i, the
utility of receiver i is a ∈ (0, 1) in the state θ′ for some constant a to be chosen and −1 in the state θ, i.e.,
ui(θ
′) = a and ui(θ) = −1 for all i.
We start by formulating the problem of computing the optimal ǫ-persuasive private signaling scheme,
which is central to our reduction. Observe that any receiver i strictly prefers action 1 at the state of nature
θ′ since ui(θ
′) = a. Since f(S) is monotone, the optimal private scheme can, without loss of generality,
always recommend action 1 to receiver i at the state θ′. As a result, the optimal ǫ-persuasive private signaling
scheme can be formulated as the following linear program, where the variables {p(S)}S⊆[n] describe the
signaling scheme for the state θ whereas the scheme always recommend action 1 in state θ′. That is, p(S) is
the probability of recommending action 1 to receivers in set S ⊆ [n] at the state of nature θ.
maximize 12f([n]) +
1
2
∑
S⊆[n] p(S)f(S)
subject to 12 [a · 1 + (−1) ·
∑
S:i∈S p(S)] ≥ −ǫ, for i = 1, ..., n.∑
S⊆[n] p(S) = 1
p(S) ≥ 0, for S ⊆ [n].
(10)
Note that LP (10) slightly differs from the standard formulation for private persuasion in that it relaxed the
persuasiveness constraint for action 1 by ǫ. Moreover, the (relaxed) persuasiveness constraint for action 0,
which is 12 · (−1) ·
∑
S:i 6∈S p(S) ≤ ǫ, trivially holds and thus is omitted. After algebraic simplifications, LP
(10) becomes the following equivalent linear program.
maximize
∑
S⊆[n] p(S)f(S)
subject to
∑
S:i∈S p(S) ≤ a+ 2ǫ, for i = 1, ..., n.∑
S⊆[n] p(S) = 1
p(S) ≥ 0, for S ⊆ [n].
(11)
Observe that LP (11) is precisely the formulation for computing the concave closure of the set function f(S)
at vector (a+2ǫ, a+2ǫ, · · · , a+2ǫ). The only discrepancy here is that the first set of constraints have “≤”
while not “=” as in a standard formulation for computing concave closure. However, this is without loss of
generality since f(S) is monotone non-decreasing and thus there always exists an optimal solution which
makes the first set of constraints all tight. For convenience, we use f+(x) to denote the concave closure of f
at the vector with all entries equaling x ∈ [0, 1], i.e., (x, x, · · · , x). In our constructed instances, the optimal
sender utility among all ǫ-persuasive private signaling schemes is 12 [f([n])+f
+(a+2ǫ)]. As a special case,
1
2 [f([n]) + f
+(a)] is the optimal sender utility with exact persuasiveness constraints. The following lemma
shows that it is NP-hard to approximate f+(x) additively.
Lemma B.1. [24, 4] There exists a constant c ∈ (0, 1) and constant a ∈ (0, 1) such that it is NP-hard to
approximate f+(a) to within c (additively) for any monotone submodular function f .6
6This lemma is used in [4] and is a slight generalization of results from [24]. Both [24, 4] used the multiplicative version of
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In the remainder of the reduction, we show that any (1− δ)-approximate ǫ-persuasive private persuasion
in the constructed instances can be converted to an additively (2ǫ/a+2δ)-optimal algorithm for computing
f+(x). Invoking Lemma B.1, this implies the NP-hardness of designing a (1− ǫ)-approximate ǫ-persuasive
private signaling scheme in poly(n1/ǫ, |Θ|) time.
Let p̂ = {p̂(S)}S⊆[n] be any ǫ-persuasive and (1 − δ)-approximate private signaling scheme for our
constructed instance. By definition, p̂ is a feasible solution to LP (10) and thus (11). We only need to argue
that the objective value of LP (11) at p̂ — denoted as ES∼p̂ f(S) =
∑
S⊆[n] p̂(S)f(S) — is close to its
optimal objective value f+(a+2ǫ). Note that the (1−δ)-approximability of p̂ is with respect to the optimal
sender utility under exact persuasiveness constraints. In other words, we have
1
2
[
f([n]) + E
S∼p̂
f(S)
]
≥
1− δ
2
[
f([n]) + f+(a)
]
,
or equivalently, ES∼p̂ f(S) ≥ (1− δ)f
+(a)− δf([n]). Notice however, we want to show that ES∼p̂ f(S)
is close to f+(a+ 2ǫ) while not f+(a). This gap is filled by the following lemma which shows that f+(a)
is not much smaller than f+(a+ 2ǫ).
Lemma B.2. (1 + 2ǫ/a)f+(a) ≥ f+(a+ 2ǫ).
Proof. Directly establishing the relationship between f+(a) and f+(a + 2ǫ) turns out to be difficult. We
instead establish the relation between f+(a) and f+(a − 2ǫ), and then utilize the concavity of f+(x) to
relate f+(a), f+(a− 2ǫ) to f+(a+ 2ǫ).
We first prove that for any a ∈ (0, 1) and ǫ ∈ (0, a2 ), f
+(a−2ǫ) ≥ f+(a) ·(1−2ǫ/a). Let {p∗(S)}S⊆[n]
be the distribution that achieves f+(a), i.e., the optimal solution to LP (11) with ǫ = 0. We use {p∗(S)}S⊆[n]
to construct a feasible (not necessarily optimal) solution to LP (11) with parameter a− 2ǫ instead of a+ 2ǫ
in the first set of constraints. For any S 6= ∅, let p(S) = a−2ǫa p
∗(S) and p(∅) = 1 −
∑
S 6=∅ p(S). This
is feasible to LP (11) with parameter a − 2ǫ because the probabilities for all the non-empty sets are scaled
down by factor (a− 2ǫ)/a. The objective for this new set of variable values is∑
S⊆[n]
p(S)f(S) =
∑
S⊆[n]
a− 2ǫ
a
· p∗(S)f(S) +
2ǫ
a
· f(∅)
≥
a− 2ǫ
a
∑
S⊆[n]
p∗(S)f(S) =
a− 2ǫ
a
f+(a).
Since {p(S)}S⊆[n] is a feasible solution to LP (11) with parameter a− 2ǫ, we thus have f
+(a− 2ǫ) ≥∑
S⊆[n] p(S)f(S) ≥
a−2ǫ
a f
+(a). Now, observe that f+(x) is a concave function in x ∈ (0, 1). This is
a well-known property of linear program maximization problem ( see, e.g., [7]). The concavity implies
f+(a− 2ǫ) + f+(a+ 2ǫ) ≤ 2f+(a). We thus have
f+(a+ 2ǫ) ≤ 2f+(a)− f+(a− 2ǫ) ≤ (1 + 2ǫ/a)f+(a).
Invoking δ-optimality of p̂ and Lemma B.2, we have
E
S∼p̂
f(S) ≥ (1− δ)f+(a)− δf([n])
≥
1− δ
1 + 2ǫ/a
f+(a+ 2ǫ)− δ
≥ f+(a+ 2ǫ)− 2ǫ/a− 2δ
the lemma – i.e., the concave closure cannot be approximated within a multiplicative factor of (1− 1/e). However, the reduction
in [24] can be easily adjusted to also prove the hardness for additive approximation by normalizing their constructed submodular
functions to be within [0, 1].
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ALGORITHM 2: Bi-Criteria Approximation for Public Persuasion
Parameters : A small constant ǫ > 0
Input: {ui(θ)}i∈[n],θ∈Θ, value oracle access to f , an α-approximate subroutine for f
Output: A public signaling scheme
1 SetK = 2 ln(2
ǫ
)/ǫ2; Compute set ∆K , consisting of allK-uniform distributions ;
2 for p˜ ∈ ∆K do
3 Compute sets A˜ = {i ∈ [n] :
∑
θ p˜θ · ui(θ) > ǫ}, B˜ = {i ∈ [n] :
∑
θ p˜θ · ui(θ) < −ǫ} and C˜ = [n] \ (A ∪B) ;
4 Let s
A˜
(p˜) = 1, s
B˜
(p˜) = 0; Employ the α-approximate subroutine to compute s
C˜
(p˜) as an α-approximation to
max
x
C˜
∈{0,1}C˜
f(s
A˜
(p˜), s
B˜
(p˜),x
C˜
).
5 end
6 Solve the following linear program with variables x(p˜)’s to obtain the public signaling scheme:
maximize
∑
p˜∈∆K
x(p˜) · f(s(p˜))
subject to
∑
p˜∈∆K
x(p˜) · p˜ = λ∑
p˜∈∆K
x(p˜) = 1
x(p˜) ≥ 0, for q˜ ∈ ∆K .
(12)
This implies that p̂ is an (additive) (2ǫ/a+ 2δ) approximation to LP (11). Crucially, the loss 2ǫ/a+ 2δ
is a constant since a is also a constant in Lemma B.1. These overall establish the NP-hardness of designing
a poly(n1/ǫ, |Θ|) time algorithm for computing a (1− ǫ)-optimal ǫ-persuasive private signaling scheme.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 4.8
We say a distribution p˜ ∈ ∆Θ is K-uniform if each of its entry pθ is a multiple of 1/K . With slight abuse
of notation, let ∆K ⊆ ∆Θ denote the set of all K-uniform distributions. Note that |∆K | = O(|Θ|
K).
The main idea of the proof is to convert any optimal signaling scheme to an efficiently computable ǫ-
persuasive α(1−βδ)-optimal signaling scheme whose posteriors are all (2 ln(2δ )/ǫ
2)-uniform distributions.
For constant ǫ, δ, we can then search for such a signaling scheme via a polynomial-size linear program by
focusing only on K-uniform posterior distributions. Details are presented in Algorithm 2.
To analyze Algorithm 2, the main step is to prove that there always exists an ǫ-persuasive α(1 − βδ)-
optimal signaling scheme whose posteriors are all K-uniform distributions for K = (2 ln(2δ )/ǫ
2). We start
by examining the sender’s expected utility U(p), as a function of any posterior distribution p ∈ ∆Θ. In
this proof, it will be convenient to view the sender’s objective function f as a function of s ∈ {0, 1}n. Let
x denote the vector of best receiver responses to the posterior distribution p, which can be constructed as
follows. Let A = {i ∈ [n] :
∑
θ pθ · ui(θ) > 0} denote the set of players whose unique best response is
action 1 under posterior belief p, B = {i ∈ [n] :
∑
θ pθ · ui(θ) < 0} denote the set of players whose unique
best response is action 0, and C = {i ∈ [n] :
∑
θ pθ · ui(θ) = 0} is the set of receivers who are indifferent
between action 0 and 1. So xA = 1, xB = 0 and we have the freedom to choose the actions for receivers in
set C . Under optimality, we have
U(p) = f(xA,xB ,xC), where xC = argmax
sC∈{0,1}C
f(xA,xB , sC). (13)
Let K = 2 ln(2δ )/ǫ
2 and K denote a set of K i.i.d. samples of states from p. Let p˜ be the empirical
distribution of the samples in K; So p˜ ∈ ∆K . Note that any player i’s expected utility under p˜ is a random
variable
∑
θ p˜θ · ui(θ) (depending on the samples), with mean
∑
θ pθ · ui(θ). Let A˜ = {i ∈ [n] :
∑
θ p˜θ ·
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ui(θ) > ǫ} denote the set of players whose unique best response is action 1 under ǫ-persuasiveness, B˜ =
{i ∈ [n] :
∑
θ p˜θ · ui(θ) < −ǫ}, and C˜ = {i ∈ [n] :
∑
θ p˜θ · ui(θ) ∈ [−ǫ, ǫ]} is the set of receivers who are
indifferent between action 0 and 1 under ǫ-persuasiveness. Note that p˜ and A˜, B˜, C˜ are also random, with
randomness from the samples K. By standard concentration bound and our choice of K , we know that
Pr
(∣∣∣∣∑
θ
p˜θ · ui(θ)−
∑
θ
pθ · ui(θ)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ
)
≥ 1− δ, ∀i ∈ [n].
Therefore, for any player i ∈ C , meaning
∑
θ pθ ·ui(θ) = 0, we know that i ∈ C˜ with probability at least
1−δ. For any i ∈ A, i ∈ A˜∪ C˜ with probability at least 1−δ and for any i ∈ B, i ∈ B˜∪ C˜ with probability
at least 1− δ. Let s ∈ {0, 1}n denote the vector of best receiver responses under ǫ-persuasiveness. We have
s
A˜
= 1, s
B˜
= 0 and the sender has the freedom to choose s
C˜
∈ {0, 1}
C˜
. Now, for any fixed A˜, B˜, C˜ , we
define an auxiliary variable y ∈ {0, 1}n based on the x described in Equation (13), as follows:
1. For any i ∈ A: if i ∈ A˜ ∪ C˜, let yi = xi = 1; otherwise i ∈ B˜ and let yi = 0.
2. For any i ∈ B: if i ∈ B˜ ∪ C˜ , let yi = xi = 0; otherwise i ∈ A˜ and let yi = 1.
3. for any i ∈ C: if i ∈ C˜, let yi = xi; if i ∈ A˜, let yi = 1; if i ∈ B˜, let yi = 0.
Note that y is a random variable where the randomness comes from sets A˜, B˜, C˜ . By definition, y is a
valid vector of receiver best responses under ǫ-persuasiveness. Moreover, we have yi = xi with probability
at least 1− δ for any i ∈ [n].
By α-approximability of f , we can efficiently find s∗
C˜
for any fixed A˜, B˜, C˜ such that
f(sA˜, sB˜ , s
∗
C˜
) ≥ α · max
s
C˜
∈{0,1}C˜
f(sA˜, sB˜ , sC˜) ≥ α · f(y).
where the last inequality is because y is one valid vector of receiver best responses. Taking expectation over
the random samples K on both sides of the above inequality, we have
E
K
[
f(sA˜, sB˜ , s
∗
C˜
)
]
≥ α · E
K
[
f(y)
]
≥ α · (1− βδ)f(x) = α(1 − βδ)U(p)
where the second inequality is due to the β-noise stability of f and the first equality is due to linearity of
expectation and EK(p˜θ) = pθ.
Note that EK p˜ = p, i.e., any p can be converted to the expectation of distributions in ∆K . Moreover,
the above derivation shows that such a conversion decreases the sender’s utility to at least its α(1 − βσ)
fraction, assuming ǫ-persuasiveness. Therefore, given the optimal signaling scheme, we can substitute each
of its posterior distribution p by a distribution over ∆K as described above, and obtain a signaling scheme
which is α(1 − βδ)-optimal and ǫ-persuasive with K = 2 ln(2δ )/ǫ
2. We can then search for this signaling
scheme by solving Linear Program (12).
Note that the above proof also goes through if both the α-approximability of f and β-stability are
additive. That is, when Equation (5) is
f(s∗T , s
0
−T ) ≥ max
sT∈{0,1}T
f(sT , s
0
−T )− α
and Equation (6) is
E
T∼p
f(T ) ≥ f(S)− βǫ,
the above argument yields an (α+ βσ)-optimal and ǫ-persuasive public signaling scheme.
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B.4 Noise Stability of Other Set Functions
In this subsection, we show that any set function f : 2[n] → R+ is n-noise-stable. Moreover, there exist
submodular functions that are not β-stable for any β < n.
We first prove the n-noise-stability for any function f . Note that any ǫ-noisy distribution p around S
must satisfy p(S) ≥ 1 − nǫ, due to the union bound: p(S) ≥ 1 −
∑
i∈S Pr(i 6∈ T )−
∑
i 6∈S Pr(i ∈ T ) ≥
1− nǫ. This implies ET∼p f(T ) ≥ p(S)f(S) ≥ f(S)− nǫ for any f : 2
[n] → [0, 1], as desired.
Next we show that supermodular functions do not admit any non-trivial upper bound for noise stability.
Consider the supermodular function f defined as follows: f(T ) = 1when T = [n] and f(T ) = 0 otherwise.
We show that for any β < n, f is not β-stable. Consider ǫ ≤ 1/n and the following ǫ-noisy distribution
around S = [n]: p(T ) = ǫ for any T such that |T | = n − 1, p([n]) = 1 − nǫ and p(T ) = 0 otherwise. For
this ǫ-noisy distribution, we have ET∼p f(T ) = f([n]) · p([n]) = 1− nǫ = f([n])− nǫ. Thus, f cannot be
β-stable for any β < n.
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C Proof of Theorem 5.1
We start by formulating the problem of computing the optimal cce-persuasive public scheme in (14), an
exponential-size linear program. The variable ϕ(θ, S) is the probability of recommending action 1 to re-
ceivers in set S ⊆ [n] at the state of nature θ.
maximize
∑
θ∈Θ λ(θ)
∑
S⊆[n] ϕ(θ, S)fθ(S)
subject to
∑
θ∈Θ
∑
S:i∈S ϕ(θ, S)λ(θ)xθ,iui(θ) ≥ Ci, for i = 1, ..., n.∑
S⊆[n] ϕ(θ, S) = 1, for θ ∈ Θ.
ϕ(θ, S) ≥ 0, for θ ∈ Θ;S ⊆ [n].
(14)
Here Ci = max{
∑
θ λθui(θ), 0} is the optimal utility of receiver i by best responding under the prior
belief λ. The following lemma proves one direction of Theorem 5.1, namely, any efficient algorithm for
maximizing f ∈ F minus a linear function can be converted to an efficient algorithm for computing the
optimal cce-persuasive public scheme.
Lemma C.1. If there is a polynomial time algorithm that maximizes f(S) −
∑
i∈S wi for any f ∈ F and
any weights wi ∈ R, then there is a polynomial time algorithm that computes the optimal cce-persuasive
public scheme for any instance in I(F).
Proof. The proof examines the dual program of LP (14) and shows that any algorithm for maximizing
f ∈ F minus a linear function can be employed to construct a separation oracle for the dual. Specifically,
the dual of LP (14) is the following LP with variables xθ for any θ ∈ Θ and yi for any i ∈ [n].
minimize −
∑n
i=1Ci · yi +
∑
θ∈Θ xθ
subject to xθ − λθ
∑
i∈S ui(θ)yi ≥ λθfθ(S), for θ ∈ Θ, S ⊆ [n].
yi ≥ 0, for i = 1, ..., n.
(15)
Note that LP (15) has polynomially many variables but exponentially many constraints. To solve LP
(15), it suffices to design an efficient separation oracle for its feasible region, denoted as P. For any given
variable values {x̂θ}θ∈Θ ∪{ŷi}i∈[n], the second set of constraints of LP (15) (i.e., yi ≥ 0) is straightforward
to check. For the first set of constraints, for any θ ∈ Θ, we need to check whether x̂θ ≥ λθ
[∑n
i∈S ŷiui(θ)+
fθ(S)
]
holds for all S ⊆ [n] or not. This is equivalent to maximizing F (s) =
∑n
i∈S ŷiui(θ) + fθ(S)
over all S ⊆ [n] and then check whether its optimal objective OPT satisfies x̂θ ≥ λθOPT or not. If so,
then constraint xθ − λθ
∑n
i∈S yiui(θ) ≥ λθfθ(S) holds for any S ⊆ [n]. Otherwise, the optimal solution
S∗ = argmaxS⊆[n] F (S) corresponds to a separating hyperplane xθ−λθ
∑
i∈S∗ ui(θ)yi = λθfθ(S
∗) since
x̂θ − λθ
∑n
i∈S∗ ui(θ)ŷi < λθfθ(S
∗) but any point in P must satisfy xθ − λθ
∑n
i∈S∗ ui(θ)yi ≥ λθfθ(S
∗) by
definition.
As a result, any polynomial-time algorithm for maximizing any f ∈ F minus a linear function can be
used to construct a polynomial time separation oracle for P. By the computational equivalence between
separation and optimization [21], we can solve LP (15), thus its dual LP (14), in polynomial time.
We now prove the converse, which is the more involved direction. Namely, given any efficient algorithm
for computing the optimal cce-persuasive public scheme for instances form I(F), we design an efficient
algorithm for the maximizing f(S) −
∑
i∈S wi for any f ∈ F and weights {wi}i∈[n]. This is also where
our proof diverges from that of [18] which only applies to the restricted case with monotone non-decreasing
sender objectives.
Given any f ∈ F and any weight {wi}i∈[n], we seek to maximize f(S) = f(S) −
∑
i∈S wi over
S ⊆ [n]. First, let S+ = {i : wi ≥ 0} and S− = {i : wi < 0} denote the set of indexes of non-negative
[resp. negative] wi’s. Note that S+ ∪ S− = [n] and S+ ∩ S− = ∅.
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The starting point of our reduction is the following linear program (a repetition of LP (8) stated here just
for convenience), with linear coefficients {βi}i∈[n] and α ∈ R as parameters, and {wi}i∈[n] and v ∈ R as
variables:
minimize
∑
i∈[n] βi · wi + α · v
subject to v +
∑
i∈S wi ≥ f(S), for S ⊆ [n].
wi ≥ 0, for i ∈ S+.
wi ≤ 0, for i ∈ S−.
(16)
The first main step of our proof is to reduce maximizing F to solving LP (16) for all possible linear
coefficients, as formally stated in the following lemma.
Lemma C.2. Maximizing f(S) = f(S)−
∑
i∈S wi over S ⊆ [n] reduces in polynomial time to solving LP
(16) for all possible combinations of objective coefficients {βi}i∈[n] and α ∈ R.
Proof. First, we show that maximizing f(S) = f(S)−
∑
i∈S wi reduces in polynomial time to a separation
oracle for the feasible region of LP (16), denoted as P for convenience. In particular, given any separation
oracle for P, we can check whether {wi}i∈[n] ∪ {v} is in P or not, for different v ∈ R. Since {wi}i∈[n]
always satisfy the second and the third set of constraints by definition, so {wi}i∈[n] ∪ {v} is feasible if and
only if v ≥ f(S) −
∑
i∈S wi for all S ⊆ [n], or equivalently, v ≥ maxS⊆[n][f(S) −
∑
i∈S wi]. As a
result, we can binary search for the v which makes {wi}i∈[n] ∪ {v} almost feasible, but not quite. More
precisely, let B denote the bit complexity of f(S) and wi, then the binary search returns the exact optimal
objective of F after O(B) steps. By setting v equaling the optimal objective minus 2−B , {wi}i∈[n] ∪ {v}
will be infeasible and the returned separating hyperplane corresponds to the optimal solution to the problem
of maximizing F .
Due to the polynomial time equivalence between separation and optimization [21], we know that maxi-
mizing F also reduces to solving LP (16) for any parameters {βi}i∈[n] and α ∈ R, as desired.
We remark that the key difference between our reduction and that of [18] is in the construction of LP
(16). In particular, [18] constructed a similar LP, but our LP (16) is more carefully constrained. This seems
necessary for the case with general sender objectives. However, the challenge is that our more constrained
LP is also arguably more difficult to solve. This is why our proof requires a more carefully crafted con-
struction of the persuasion instances in order to take care of the intricacies arising from these additional
constraints, as we will do next.
In particular, the second main step of our reduction is to reduce solving LP (16) to computing the optimal
cce-persuasive public scheme for instances in I(F). We start by ruling out some situations where LP (16)
can be directly solved without employing persuasion problems as a subroutine, as stated in the following
lemma. This will simplify our reduction later.
Lemma C.3. The optimal solution to LP (16) can be computed in polynomial time when α ≤ 0.
Proof. The proof follows a case analysis. When α < 0, we can set wi = 0 for all i and let v to be arbitrarily
large. It is easy to verify that this variable assignment will always be feasible to LP (16) and leads to an
objective of αv, which tends to −∞ as v →∞.
Next, we consider the case of α = 0, with another level of case analysis.
1. If there exists i ∈ S+ such that βi < 0, we set wi = v/2 and wj = 0 for all j 6= i. By letting v →∞,
it is easy to verify that this variable assignment will be feasible to LP (16) and lead to objective value
βiv/2, again tending to −∞ as v →∞.
2. Similarly, if there exists i ∈ S− such that βi > 0, we can set wi = −v/2 and wj = 0 for all j 6= i,
resulting in an objective of −∞ as v →∞.
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3. Otherwise, we must have βi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ S+ and βi ≤ 0 for all i ∈ S−. This implies that the
objective value equals
∑
i∈S+
βiwi+
∑
i∈S−
βiwi+αv ≥ 0 for any feasible solution. Now we can set
wi = 0 for all i ∈ [n] and v to be sufficiently large. This will lead to a feasible and optimal solution
to LP (16), with optimal objective value 0.
Therefore, when α ≤ 0, LP (16) can be directly solved in polynomial time.
As a result of Lemma C.3, to solve LP (16) we only need to focus on the situation α > 0. This case
turns out to reduce to persuasion over I(F), as formally stated in the following lemma. Note that, Lemma
C.4 and C.3, together with Lemma C.2, prove the other direction of Theorem 5.1.
Lemma C.4. Solving LP (17) for α > 0 and arbitrary {βi}
n
i=1 reduces in polynomial time to computing
the optimal cce-persuasive public schemes for instances in I(F).
Proof. Since α > 0 and re-scaling all the coefficients of a linear program by a strictly positive factor will not
change its optimal solution, we can rescale coefficients of LP (16) by the factor 1/α to obtain an equivalent
LP with α = 1. We instead consider solving the dual program of LP (16) (assuming α = 1), as follows:
maximize
∑
S⊆[n] p(S) · f(S)
subject to
∑
S⊆[n] p(S) = 1∑
S:i∈S p(S) ≤ βi, for i ∈ S+.∑
S:i∈S p(S) ≥ βi, for i ∈ S−.
p(S) ≥ 0, for S ⊆ [n].
(17)
where p(S) for all S ⊆ [n] are variables.
We claim that, to solve LP (17), it is without loss of generality to focus on the case βi ∈ [0, 1] for any
i ∈ [n]. This is because the constraints p(S) ≥ 0 and
∑
S⊆[n] p(S) = 1 imply
∑
S:i∈S p(S) ∈ [0, 1].
Therefore, for any i ∈ S+, βi < 0 will imply infeasibility of LP (17) while βi > 1 will lead to the same
feasible space as βi = 1. In other words, it is without loss to only consider βi ∈ [0, 1] for i ∈ S+. Similar
argument shows that we can also w.l.o.g. focus on βi ∈ [0, 1] for any i ∈ S−.
Assuming βi ∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ [n], we now construct a persuasion instance and show that its optimal
cce-persuasive public scheme informs an optimal solution to LP (17). There are n receivers and two states
of nature θ0, θ1 with λ(θ0) = λ(θ1) = 1/2. The sender’s utility function satisfies fθ0 ≡ 0 (i.e., the trivial
function) and fθ1 = f (i.e., the function of our interest). Define ui(θ0) = βi and ui(θ1) = −1 for any
i ∈ S+, while define ui(θ0) = −(1− βi) and ui(θ1) = 1 for any i ∈ S−.
Let ϕ∗ be an optimal cce-persuasive public scheme, in particular an optimal solution to the instantiation
of LP (14) for our instance. Without loss of generality, we can adjust ϕ∗ so that at the state θ0 it always
recommends action 1 to any receiver i ∈ S+ and recommends action 0 to any receiver i ∈ S− (i.e., setting
ϕ∗(θ0, S+) = 1). This will maintain the feasibility of ϕ
∗ because the adjustment does not violate any cce-
persuasiveness constraints — it recommends each receiver’s true optimal action at the state θ0 and this would
only strengthen each receiver’s incentive. Moreover, the adjustment maintains optimality of ϕ∗ because the
sender’s utility satisfies fθ0 ≡ 0 anyway.
We now instantiate LP (14) for our constructed instance, w.l.o.g., after restricting ϕ∗(θ0, S+) = 1. This
leads to the following linear program, for which we know ϕ∗ is an optimal solution.
maximize 12 · 0 +
1
2
∑
S⊆[n] ϕ(θ1, S)f(S)
subject to
∑
S⊆[n] ϕ(θ1, S) = 1
1 · (βi) +
∑
S:i∈S ϕ(θ1, S) · (−1) ≥ max{βi − 1, 0}, for i ∈ S+.
0 · (−1 + βi) +
∑
S:i∈S ϕ(θ1, S) · 1 ≥ max{−1 + βi + 1, 0}, for i ∈ S−.
ϕ(θ1, S) ≥ 0, for θ ∈ Θ;S ⊆ [n].
(18)
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After simplifications, it is easy to see that the second set of constraints is precisely
∑
S:i∈S ϕ(θ1, S) ≤ βi
for any i ∈ S+ and the third set of constraints is
∑
S:i∈S ϕ(θ1, S) ≥ βi for any i ∈ S−. It is now clear that
setting p(S) = ϕ∗(θ1, S) yields an optimal solution to LP (17).
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